MANPADS Proliferation

• Strela-2 (SA-7a): Fielded by the Soviet military in 1968, the SA-7 is among the least sophisticated and most highly proliferated of these weapons. Strela-2s can engage aircraft flying above 50 meters and below 1500 meters, but only when launched from behind the targeted aircraft. Its infrared (IR) seeker - the device the missile uses to identify its target - homes in on the infrared energy emission of the aircraft. The seeker can be fooled by simple countermeasures such as flares. The missile's small 1.17 kg warhead detonates upon impact with the target.³
• Strela-2M (SA-7b): The Strela-2M was developed shortly after the first Strela to address several of its shortcomings. Improvements in the guidance system allows the missile to engage transport planes and helicopters head-on, unless the aircraft is flying faster than 540 km/h. The SA-7b can hit targets flying at much higher altitudes (2300 meters), and as far away as 4.2 km.⁴
• Strela-3(SA-14): The SA-14 was accepted into Soviet service in 1974. Improvements to the missile's IR seeker reduce the effectiveness of flares as decoys and allow the user to engage jet aircraft head-on. The SA-14 also features a larger, more lethal warhead (1.8 kg) and a launching mechanism that prevents the user from shooting at targets outside of its range. It can effectively engage targets flying above 30m and below 3000 meters. ⁵
• Igla-1 (SA-16) and Igla (SA-18): Igla missiles have warheads that are smaller but more lethal than the Strela's, and their warheads are equipped with both a proximity and an impact fuse. The missile's IR-seeker is specifically designed to distinguish between countermeasures (such as flares) and the targeted aircraft. Both have a maximum range 5.2 km, and are able to engage targets operating between 10 meters and 3500 meters. ⁶
• Stinger (FIM-92A/B/C/D): The Stinger is similar in capabilities to the Russian Igla series. More recent versions are equipped with a cooled two-color, infrared-ultraviolet detector that discriminates between flares and the target. Stingers are able to effectively engage targets head-on, from behind and from the side. The missile's maximum range is 4800 meters, which is comparable to the Igla, but it has a much shorter minimum range (200 meters versus the Igla's 800 meter minimum). It is one of the fastest MANPADS missiles, traveling at Mach 2.2.⁷

• lethal - The history of MANPADS usage by guerrillas and terrorists underscores the efficacy of these weapons against both civilian and military targets. Estimates of deaths resulting from MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft range from 500 to 1000.⁹ While most of these deaths were from attacks on smaller aircraft, the Congressional Research Service identified 5 cases in which large civilian turbojet aircraft were targeted. In two of the five cases, the outcome was catastrophic - all people on board were killed.¹⁰
  
  Insurgent groups seek MANPADS because they are effective against attack helicopters and other aircraft that are used in counter-insurgency operations. During the Soviet occupations of Afghanistan, rebels used U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles to damage or destroy hundreds of aircraft, degrading the threat from Soviet airpower.¹¹
• highly portable and concealable - MANPADS are around 5 feet long and weigh approximately 30 to 40 pounds.¹² They fit in a gulf club bag, in the back of a truck, or in the cargo area of a small boat.
• inexpensive - Early model MANPADS can be acquired on the black market for several thousand dollars. In exceptional circumstances, that price can drop to as low as a few hundred dollars; manpads pilfered from Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's massive arms stockpiles were later purchased by the Coalition Provisional Authority for a mere $500 apiece. While later generation manpads cost significantly more (>$30,000), they are still within easy reach of well financed terrorist and criminal groups.¹³

• Improved airport perimeter security - Patrolling the areas around airports could help to detect and deter MANPADS attacks. However, the personnel and equipment necessary to thoroughly patrol the nation's 450 primary airports would be very costly, and the protection provided by these patrols would be imperfect at best. Incoming and departing aircraft fly within the range of many MANPADS for approximately 25 miles, requiring patrols capable of policing a 300-square-mile area surrounding the airport. Nonetheless, more limited patrols could help to deter attacks with shorter-range weapons (such as the SA-7), and at airports surrounded by water or flat, featureless terrain.¹⁶

• Air Traffic Procedures can be altered to reduce the likelihood of a succesful MANPADS attack. Replacing gradual approach and descent patterns with spiral descents and steep, rapid climbouts would reduce the amount of time that commercial aircraft fly within range of modern MANPADS. Such changes are not without risks and costs, however. Spiral descents are harrowing for passengers and would require pilot retraining. Quick climbouts reduce the margin of safety in the event of engine failure. Furthermore, even with these changes to flight patterns, the area over which planes would be within range of MANPADS would still be significant.¹⁷

• Technical Countermeasures- There are a variety of protective systems designed to detect and foil MANPADS attacks. These include the following systems: ¹⁸

• Infrared Decoy Flares confuse the infra-red seekers of earlier MANPADS models by dispensing materials that give off an IR signature that is similar to, or more intense than, the signature of the aircraft itself. These systems are less effective against newer models of MANPADS, which are better able to differentiate between flares and the aircraft. Many flare systems also pose a fire hazard, precluding their use in heavily populated areas.¹⁹
• Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCMs) direct infrared energy at the missile's seeker, causing it to veer off course and away from the targeted aircraft. Infrared seeking missiles have seekers - devices that are sensitive to IR - that monitor a target's location and trajectory by constantly measuring the infrared energy given off by the target. If the missile is off course (i.e. the target moves to the outer edge of the seeker's field of view), the seeker sends an electronic signal to the missile's guidance system, which uses the missile's fins to change its trajectory. In this way, the missile makes continuous, minor adjustments to its flight path until it intercepts its target.
  
  DIRCMs direct a beam of infrared energy at the missile's seeker. The beam, which generates a target signal that is stronger than that of the targeted aircraft, fools the guidance system into thinking the missile is off course. The guidance system responds by adjusting the missile's flight path. The DIRCM continues to direct the IR beam at the missile until it is so off course that it no longer poses a threat to the aircraft.

• Missile warning systems (MWS) alert the targeted aircraft, including the aircraft's IRCMs, of an incoming missile. ²⁰

• redundancy and separation of flight controls and hydraulic systems,
• improved fire and explosion suppression systems,
• installation of fuel shut-off valves or self-sealing fuel lines,
• hardening of vital areas that are vulnerable to external (MANPADS) threats.²¹

• The Wassenaar Arrangement's (WA)²² Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS - Through the adoption of the Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS, the WA's 33 participating states agreed to a set of criteria for evaluating potential MANPADS exports. The agreement discourages MANPADS transfers to end-users other than states, and to governments that are unwilling or unable to protect against theft, loss, misuse, or diversion of the MANPADS themselves or related technical information. It also identifies several safeguards that importing governments should implement, including storing the firing mechanism and the missile in separate locations, taking monthly inventories of imported MANPADs, and re-exporting imported systems only after receiving prior consent from the exporting government.
• The G8 Action Plan of 2 June 2003 - At their June 2003 meeting in Evian, the Group of 8 major industrialized democracies endorsed the WA's Elements for Export Controls on MANPADS and agreed to take several additional steps. Especially noteworthy is the Group's commitment to
  • explore the feasibility of preventing unauthorized use of these weapons through the development of launch control features and other design changes;
• help other countries to collect, secure and destroy surplus units;
• exchange information on "uncooperative countries and entities."
• report on their progress toward implementing these steps in time for the 2004 G8 meeting.
• 2003 APEC Summit, Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future - At the October 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting, APEC's 21 member states agreed to strengthen national controls on MANPADS production, exports, and stockpile security. Like the G8 agreement, the Declaration also calls on members to ban transfers to sub-national groups, exchange information on national efforts to implement the agreement, and to explore the feasibility of launch control devices.
• Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Co-operation, Decision No. 7/03: Man-portable Air Defense Systems - July 2003, the OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation urged member states to "propose projects for tackling MANPADS-related problems..." by improving stockpile security and boarder controls. To faciliate discussion on these and related topics, the OSCE committed to compiling a matrix of data on MANPADS, which will be gathered from submissions by member states as part of their June 2003 information exchange on small arms. The deadline for preparing the matrix was 10 October 2003.

Note: Bold text documents provide a good overview of the MANPADS threat and/or policy options for addressing the threat.